Conventional wisdom argues that environmental policy is less costly if it induces the development of cleaner technologies. In contrast to this argument, we show that once the second-best nature of actual economies is taken into account, the cost of environmental policy may well be larger with induced technical change (ITC) than without. Thus, ITC may lower both the emissions reductions and the welfare gains associated with environmental policy. In an endogenous policy framework, ITC may reduce the desired stringency of the policy. JEL Classi cation: H23, O38, Q55, Q58
Introduction
A widely held tenet among environmental economists and policy makers alike is that the development of new, cleaner technologies decreases the cost of pollution reductions. The natural consequence of this view is that policy-induced technical change lowers the costs of complying with environmental regulations and facilitates the implementation of ambitious environmental policies. This deep-rooted trust in the salvi c power of technology, however, may appear unjusti ed in light of the historical record showing that over the course of the last two centuries a number of major technological developments ushered dramatic improvements in energy e ciency, while at the same time fostering large increases in energy use and polluting emissions. 1 In other words, the process of technological change has in the past often proven to be pollution-using, rather than pollution-saving.
To explain this apparent paradox, it is useful to distinguish between the general notion that the adoption of new technologies responds to pro t incentives, and the more speci c notion whereby technological change responds to policies in so far as they a ect pro ts -a distinction between endogenous innovation and policy-induced technical change. Within an endogenous innovation framework, rms implement innovations they expect to increase their pro ts, and the pollution-saving or pollution-using nature of the technology is immaterial. When environmental policy makes pollution more expensive, however, it also makes pollution-saving innovations relatively more pro table than pollution-using ones. For this reason in the dominant view (environmental) policy-induced technical change (ITC) is good for the environment: the policy aligns the innovative rm's pro t motives with the policymaker's environmental goals and ITC makes the policy more e ective and less costly.
In this paper we show that this view may break down in the presence of externalities, distortions, or general equilibrium e ects. We emphasize two main avenues behind this result. On the one hand, while environmental policy would become cheaper if rms adopted pollution-saving technology, they may actually nd it optimal to respond to changes in policy by instead adopting pollution-using technology if the latter turns out to be more pro table from their point of view. This may happen in a second-best world in which price distortions introduce a wedge between the rms' pro t incentives and society's policy aims. On the other hand, even if rms focus on pollution-saving innovations, their response may impose a large enough cost to society to end up crowding out valuable innovations. 2 The literature has so far widely neglected these possibilities, either by assuming that innovation can only be pollution-saving or by abstracting from second-best and general equilibrium issues.
The key mechanism by which ITC may increase the cost of environmental policy is thus by decoupling the private returns to investment in clean technologies from their social returns. To illustrate this mechanism, it is enough to consider the role of a simple production externality from pollution. As pollution falls, rms' production and pro ts bene t, but the rms themselves do not recognize this external e ect when making decisions on their emis-sion levels and technologies. In the presence of such an externality, rms might pro tably respond to the bigger market size by increasing their production and emissions, and by investing in polluting-using capital. To make matters worse, investment incentives may also be distorted by suboptimal policies, such as subsidies to polluting inputs that trigger pollution-using investment and innovation.
Our results challenge the conventional wisdom and show that ITC may raise the opportunity cost of pollution abatement, reduce the willingness to pay for environmental quality, or both. The presence of ITC may thus make environmental policy targets more costly to achieve, or lead to situations where policies become optimally less ambitious, implying lower pollution reductions. 3 These results are at odds with most of the existing literature, which instead nds that ignoring ITC leads to overestimating the costs of environmental policy. 4, 5 In this paper, we use a stylized, static framework that lets us transparently identify the driving forces behind our results. These results are driven by a combination of elements that are empirically relevant but often neglected in other analyses of induced technical change.
In particular, our conclusions emerge in a second-best world in which environmental quality a ects productivity and thus interacts with investment decisions. We also nd that they are more likely to arise when innovations lead to a signi cant increase in the demand for physical capital. Such complementarity between new technology and physical capital matches historical patterns of innovation and investment, with expansions in sectors where new products and improved technologies are introduced, and with displacements of older technologies by newer, more capital-intensive ones. 6 In what follows, we show how two simple modi cations of the standard set-up, introduced 3 Note that, in the model presented below, environmental policy is both desirable, in the sense that it leads to welfare improvements, and e ective, in the sense that it achieves pollution reductions. Our claim that ITC reduces the e ectiveness or increases the cost of environmental policy refers to the comparison between an hypothetical world where technology is exogenously given, and the more realistic world in which technology and investment react to changes in the relative prices of production factors. 4 In the context of climate change, the latest IPCC report discusses climate policy models with ITC and concludes that "These models demonstrate that ignoring induced innovation overstates the costs of climate control" (IPCC, 2014, p.257) . Similar positions have been expressed in the well-known Stern Review (Stern, 2006) and by Goulder (2004) . Modelling e orts that support this view are discussed at length in the context of the Innovation Modelling Comparison Project by Edenhofer et al. (2006) . An extreme representation of this paradigm is o ered by Acemoglu et al. (2012) , who show that environmental policy only needs to be temporary to prevent environmental collapse by redirecting technological change. 5 As discussed later in the paper, a number of authors have previously argued that technical change might lead to an increases in the marginal cost of pollution abatement (Amir et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Bauman et al., 2008; Perino and Requate, 2012; Brechet and Meunier, 2014) . We di er from these contribution in that their focus is on partial equilibrium models of technology adoption, whereas we provide a general equilibrium view of induced innovation in the presence of additional distortions. Gans (2012) nds that environmental policy may reduce innovation through a scale e ect. Our results in the present paper generalize his ndings since, rather than relying on speci c functional forms, we derive our results in a general setting.
6 Looking back to the list of innovations in footnote 1, one might think of the development of petrochemistry and plastics -whose versatility in production lead to a myriad novel uses -as well as jet engines used for transatlantic ights as examples of new products introduced with increased demand for capital as a result. The other technologies in that list t better among the capital-intensive innovations. Large steam-powered iron pumps and mills replaced hand-operated wooden ones during the industrial revolution, automobiles replaced horses and carriages, etc. 4 to capture empirically relevant features of environmental policy, have profound implications for policy outcomes. First, while we assume that the direct (ceteris-paribus) e ect of new technology is to reduce pollution, our modelling reveals that the use of such technology may impact the environment adversely through indirect e ects. In the rst part of our paper we show that the general-equilibrium e ect of the new technology can actually be either in favor or against the environment, depending on the degree to which new technology fosters demand for physical capital. Moreover, we demonstrate that rms faced with more stringent environmental regulation might decide to either increase or decrease their investment in new technology. Thus, more stringent environmental regulation does not necessarily lead to more technology creation, and might, instead, crowd-out such investment. We nd, for example, that for both price and quantity instruments a tightening of the environmental regulation might either crowd-in brown technology or crowd it out, implying in each case very di erent e ects on the marginal cost of pollution abatement. By contrast, most existing contributions studying the interaction between environmental policy and induced innovation assume implicitly or explicitly that investment in new technologies necessarily lowers the marginal cost of reducing emissions. Given such assumption, it is not surprising that environmental policy that increases investment lowers abatement costs, inducing additional emissions reductions (Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Nordhaus, 2002; Parry et al., 2003; Popp, 2004; Sue Wing, 2006; Gerlagh, 2007) .
The second aspect in which our modelling choices di er from most other contributions in the literature is our explicit recognition that environmental policy is not conducted in a void, but it rather happens in the presence of a number of other externalities, notably externalities due to market failures in innovation (Ja e et al., 2003) . Realistically, our model captures the idea that existing policies may fail to correctly internalize the full social benets from innovation (Griliches, 1992) , at the same time that they provide excessive support to investments that complement polluting inputs such as coal or oil (Davis, 2014; Coady et al., 2015) . This deviation from the rst-best has important implications for the welfare consequences of environmental policy. In a context where (exogenous) environmental policy is arbitrarily tightened from an initial suboptimal level, for example, we show that it is possible for welfare to improve less under ITC than under exogenous technology. In an endogenous policy context, where the stringency of regulation depends on preferences, instead, the presence of additional distortions introduces the possibility that following an increase in the degree of 'greenness' of preferences, ITC may induce the regulator to become less ambitious in setting environmental targets. This is because in this context the desired reductions in pollution come at the cost of relatively larger falls in consumption, and/or because the regulator might optimally decide to trade-o smaller welfare gains in terms of pollution reductions against potential large welfare costs along other dimensions.
The main aim of this paper is to present a tractable model that generalizes existing approaches and allows us to derive novel results. Contrary to the dominant view, we show that the induced change in technology driven by environmental policy may (partially) undo the regulator's e orts. We also show that, given the presence of additional externalities, ITC may end up reducing the optimal stringency of environmental policy. Transparently, these 'unconventional' results arise under completely standard assumptions and are not just an intellectual curiosum.
The policy implications of our analysis are striking. That technology facilitates the working
of environmental policy measures should not be taken for granted, as environmental policy might instead end up being less e ective or more expensive, depending on how technology actually responds. Crucially, ambitious environmental policy e orts that rely on signicant shifts in the existing technological paradigm need to be complemented by carefully designed measures to ensure that the incentives that emerge for investors are aligned with those of the social planner, in order to avoid environmental policy taking on an unexpected, paler shade of green.
In the rest of the paper, we build our investigation in steps. After a description of the model (Section 2) and the rst-best outcome (Section 3), our analysis begins with an investigation of ITC within a framework with exogenous policy in Section 4. In Section 5, we shift our attention to a second-best environmental policy set-up. Finally, Section 6 discusses the relationship between our results and the existing literature, elaborates on some policy implications, and concludes.
The model: rms, policy and consumers
In our economy, a continuum of unit mass of identical rms produce the nal good, Y , using technology, H , physical capital, K, and pollution, P. Output is strictly increasing in all (private) inputs. Output also increases with environmental quality, N , that enhances the productivity of all inputs, i.e. it increases total factor productivity (TFP). 7 Throughout the paper we interpret H as an intangible input -technology for short -used in production.
It can be thought of as ideas, blueprints or patents purposefully developed via conscious e orts in the economy. It follows that K should be thought of as all the tangible inputsi.e. physical capital -needed to embody these ideas and turn them into useful innovations (e.g. Solow, 1960; Intriligator, 1965) . Environmental quality, N , is a 'public input' in the sense that aggregate pollution reduces environmental quality, but each individual rm has a negligible impact on the aggregate. Hence, the productivity e ect of a cleaner environment is an externality. Thus, each rm s ∈ [0, 1] produces nal output according to the following production function, 8
where environmental quality is normalized as the negative of aggregate pollution:
We assume that the marginal productivity of all inputs is strictly positive and decreasing, as customary. Given our assumption above that there exists a positive production externality 7 The aggregate nature of our model implies a rather comprehensive understanding of what constitutes pollution in this context. In fact, anything that reduces environmental quality, N , represents pollution in our model, while environmental quality is anything that either boosts TFP or that provides utility to consumers. In this respect, P is a broad indicator of the environmental and ecological footprint of human productive activities and should be thought of as encompassing polluting emissions and land use, as well as habitat and biodiversity loss, ecosystem services loss, and much more. 8 Throughout the paper, we use capital letters to indicate variables and lower case ones denote functions. Moreover, we use subscripts to indicate partial derivatives, so that ∂z(X ,
from environmental quality, we let KN > 0, H N > 0, and P N > 0. The empirical literature suggests that polluting inputs and capital are complements, 9 which leads us to assume KP > 0.
Several assumptions are possible in principle regarding the sign and relative magnitude of HK and HP . In the interest of a concise presentation, in the main text we derive our results for the most interesting cases and address alternative situations in footnotes, as relevant. 10 The rst assumption we make in the main text is that technology is a gross substitute for pollution, all else equal. This assumption ensures that technology reduces the demand for polluting inputs, ceteris paribus: 11 Assumption 1. Technology and pollution are gross substitutes, PH < 0.
In the introduction, we argued that in the past a number of key new technologies increased demand for capital. Indeed, it seems undisputable that steam powered pumps and looms, internal combustion engines, plastics and fertilizers, jet planes and personal computer were all so successful in increasing the productivity of physical capital, that demand for pollution-intensive capital boomed. Thus, while in general not ruling out other possibilities, we are naturally led by this historical evidence to see H and K as complements in this context. We thus have our second assumption: Assumption 2. Technology and physical capital are gross complements, HK > 0.
The third restriction we impose in the main text ensures that capital becomes more productive if rms are allowed to pollute more, even taking into account the negative externality to production due to environmental quality, i.e. Each rm can acquire technology and physical capital through costly investment. A higher level of either stock requires an increasingly larger amount of investment, I (s) and (s), respectively. In the spirit of Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986), we assume that for both types of investment aggregate level a ects the cost of investment for the individual rm in the form of knowledge spillovers. Since the rm's impact on aggregate investment is negligible, the e ect of investment on costs through such spillovers constitutes an externality. Formally, the cost incurred by rm s to acquire more technology is
where H is aggregate technology, i.e.
the corresponding function for physical capital is
where K is the aggregate level of physical capital:
Our monotonicity and convexity assumptions above imply that i H > 0 and i HH > 0, as well as i K > 0 and i KK > 0. As regards knowledge spillovers, two alternative situations are possible in principle. First, the learning-by-doing case, where aggregate investment reduces both marginal and total investment cost and i H < 0 and i HH < 0, for example. Second, the congestion case, where the opposite happens, e.g. due to patent races or shing-out (cf. Jones, 1995). In this case i H > 0 and i HH > 0. In the interest of brevity, in the rest of the paper we only focus on the learning-by-doing case: 12
Assumption 4. i H < 0, i HH < 0, and i HH + i HH < 0; similarly, j K < 0, j KK < 0, and j KK + j KK < 0.
To ensure a well de ned equilibrium, we additionally need to rule out cases where the external e ects are too strong, to this end we assume the following: 13
Each rm chooses the level of capital, technology, and pollution to maximize its pro ts, taking into account the regulations it faces. Regulation consist of a price on pollution equal to τ -which, depending on the policy instrument, can be either an explicit pollution tax, or the price of pollution permits under a cap and trade system 14 -and subsidies equal to σ 12 The last assumption in each set of inequalities simply assures that the gains from experience do not vanish with the size of the economy. These assumptions are satis ed by common speci cations like the Cobb-Douglas, where i (H, H ) ∝ H η H ψ with ψ < 0 < η + ψ − 1, for example, or the quadratic, in which case
13 The positiveness of the expression in Assumption 5 is required for the stability of the symmetric Nash equilibrium. If the expression were negative, which would arise for su ciently strong learning by doing e ects (i H H su ciently negative), an arbitrary small increase in investment by some rms (akin to a "tremble" in game theoretical parlance) would trigger su cient spillovers to other rms for them to increase investment as well, without ever returning to the original symmetric equilibrium. Full details of the formal argument are available from the authors upon request.
14 If we let P (s) be the permits allocated to rm s and P = 1 0 P (s)ds the total amount of permits in the market, the assumption that rms are identical implies that, in equilibrium, P (s) = P = P, for each s. This has the further implication that dP = dP: any tightening of the aggregate cap translates into an identical reduction in emissions for each individual rm. For economy of exposition, from now on we refer to a tightening of the cap directly as a reduction in P, rather than inP.
S G E P ITC 8 and θ for each unit of technology or physical capital it invests in, respectively. 15 We assume that further distortions are avoided by imposing that any revenue from taxation or from the auctioning of permits is lump-sum rebated to households.
The pro ts of rm s are given by: 16
where we normalize the price of the nal good to 1, so that (·) denotes revenue.
From our assumption that all rms are identical, it follows that they will be symmetric in equilibrium, so that we can drop the rm indicator in what follows. In the symmetric equilibrium, environmental quality and aggregate investment in the two types of capitalsee (2), (4), and (6) -take the following simple forms:
Our representative consumer derives utility from her consumption of the nal good, and from her enjoyment of the natural environment. Formally, we write
where C is consumption, i.e. the amount of aggregate output net of investment costs,
We conform to standard assumptions by letting u z > 0, u zz < 0, for each input z = C, N , and u CN = u NC ≥ 0. We use ϕ in the utility function to parameterize the relative preference for environmental quality. An increase in ϕ raises the marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality,
and thus represents a greening of preferences. 17 15 We model support to investment as subsidies per unit of capital, be it technology, H , or physical capital, K. Alternatively, one could consider a subsidy per unit of investment cost, which would complicate the analytical expressions without changing the results. Notice, moreover, that in principle σ and θ might well need to correct for a congestion externality (i.e. a negative knowledge spillover), in which case they would become negative subsidies, i.e. taxes. 16 Notice that we have a market with homogenous output and price taking rms. In equilibrium, positive pro ts accrue due to an implicit xed factor, e.g. managerial talent. Alternatively, we could have assumed monopolistic competition with pro ts due to product di erentiation. This is the usual modelling practice in the endogenous growth literature. As long as rms are symmetric, no substantial changes would arise in the conclusions, although the results would be complicated by the additional externality stemming from monopolistic price setting. 17 We assume that ω C > 0, ω N < 0. Moreover, we normalizing ω ϕ to 1 such that we can conveniently express the preference shift mentioned in the main text as dϕ
3 Solving the model: the rst-best
In the rst-best equilibrium, the social planner chooses levels of H , K, and P to maximize the representative agent's utility subject to the constraints represented by the available technology (1) and by the natural environment (2). At the optimum, the three types of externalities discussed above are all correctly internalized.
The optimal level of investment in technology, H , is obtained when the marginal productivity of any addition to the stock is exactly o set by the increase in the cost of investment, net of the cost savings due to learning-by-doing, i.e.
Similarly, for physical capital, K, we have:
Finally, the optimal level of pollution emerges when, at the margin, any increase in output from the emission of a further unit of pollution is just compensated by the productivity losses and the decrease in utility arising from the additional deterioration of environmental quality. Formally,
In a regulated market equilibrium the representative rm chooses physical capital, technology and pollution to maximize its pro ts, see (7). The equilibrium satis es the following rst-order conditions,
where σ , θ and τ are the subsidies to the di erent types of investment and the mandated price of pollution discussed in section 2.
From (12)- (14), it is immediate to see that the rst-best outcome discussed above can be decentralized as a Nash equilibrium provided that the investment subsidies and the Pigouvian tax are given by:
While the rst-best policy that simultaneously satis es (18)- (20) is a useful benchmark for our analysis, it is hardly ubiquitous. Indeed, in reality much of the environmental policy debate refers to the introduction or the strengthening of pollution reducing measures, as well as the phasing out of ill-designed subsidies. For this reason, from now on we assume
that the level of the pollution tax (or, equivalently, of the cap) is exogenously xed at some arbitrary level lower (higher, respectively) than the one in (20). We further assume that technology is under-provided at the initial equilibrium, whereas physical capital is overprovided. In short, we make the following assumptions:
Assumption 6. The policy instruments in initial equilibrium satisfy τ < τ * , σ < σ * , and θ > θ * .
This assumption realistically implies that there are reasons to advocate a tighter environmental policy, that in the market equilibrium rms underinvest in technology relative to the social optimum, and that subsidies exist that make polluting inputs 'too cheap' in the market equilibrium.
In this context, we will focus on studying the impact of a marginal tightening of environmental policy. Such a policy intervention is formally given by either an increase in the tax rate dτ > 0, or by a reduction of the cap, i.e. dP < 0. In later sections, as our focus shifts to endogenous policy, we allow the consumers' willingness to pay for environmental quality to determine the environmental tax (or cap). In such situations, our thought experiment becomes one whereby preferences become greener -i.e. we study what happens when the marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality increases -and we investigate an increase in ϕ (see the discussion in Section 2, and footnote 17).
It is worth emphasizing at this stage that in what follows our aim is to gauge the impact of ITC. To isolate the e ect of technical change, we then compare outcomes under exogenous technology -i.e. situations where changes in policy do not a ect the level of H -and outcomes in which H is, instead, allowed to endogenously adjust to changes in policy -i.e. the ITC case. In the interest of clarity, it is useful to write the relevant equilibrium relationships as functions of the environmental variable, P, and the key endogenous variable of interest, H . Using the equilibrium de nitions of N , H , and K in (8), and substituting them into (16), we see immediately that the equilibrium level of physical capital can be written in terms of P and H only, as: 18
Using this expression and substituting the equilibrium values of N and H into the rst-order conditions (15) and (17), we can fully characterize each rm's choices in the symmetric Nash equilibrium purely in terms of H and P as follows:
In the expressions above, r is the (excess) marginal return to investment in H , whereas m is the rm's marginal cost of pollution abatement (MAC), de ned as the loss in output due to a marginal reduction in pollution, taking as given all the other inputs to production.
18 Throughout the paper we will add a tilde "∼" on a function symbol to highlight the fact that the variable of interest depends, in a symmetric equilibrium, on P and H only. 4 Induced technical change and exogenous environmental policy
We now begin our analysis of the role of ITC for the cost of environmental policy, starting with the workhorse model of environmental economics, i.e. a set-up with exogenous policy.
Within this framework, we analyze the impact of a marginal tightening of environmental policy with and without induced technological change. As explained above, our aim is to contrast the exogenous technology equilibrium with the ITC one.
A marginal tightening of environmental policy
We start from equation (23), which describes the equilibrium relationship between the level of pollution and its price, for a given level of technology. Totally di erentiating this equation, and rearranging terms, we get the following expression: 19, 20 dτ dP
This equation separates changes in the marginal cost of abatement that occur as pollution changes, i.e. movements along the MAC curve, from changes arising as a consequence of changes in technology, i.e. shifts of the MAC curve itself. As indicated, the second term thus captures the e ect of induced technical change. This component is traditionally assumed to be negative in the literature, so that the MAC curve shifts down as new technology is adopted. 21 This, however, turns out not to be the case in our framework where the reverse shift emerges quite naturally. Before discussing this point further, however, we need to take a closer look at the impact of ITC on the MAC.
The ITC term is itself composed of two parts, m H , which gauges the impact of changes in technology on the marginal cost of pollution abatement, and dH /dP, which instead captures the impact of changes in pollution on the stock of technology. To make some inroads into understanding the rst of the two, we partially di erentiate (23) with respect to H and use (21) to get:
The rst term at the right-hand side of this expression informs us that, given our assumption that pollution and technology are gross substitutes, the direct e ect of an increase in the technology stock is to reduce the marginal cost of pollution reductions. The second term, however, highlights an additional channel through which changes in technology affect the cost of pollution reduction. Since m is also a function of K, the MAC is a ected by changes in the physical capital stock that occur as a consequence of changes in technology ( k H ). Equation (25) informs us that these induced changes in K may o set, and even reverse, the direct e ect of H on the MAC. This possibility arises whenever the degree of complementary between technology and physical capital is su ciently large. We characterize a situation where the MAC curve shifts upwards following an increase in technology investment as a case of brown technology. When the MAC curve shifts downwards as technology improves, instead, we talk of technology being green. This latter case arises when the two types of investment are not su ciently complementary for the sign of m H to be positive. 22 Formally, we have:
Lemma 1. In the model discussed above, technology is brown whenever
and green otherwise.
Proof. Using (25), simply solve m H > 0 in terms of H K to get the expression above.
So far we have shown that, under perfectly plausible assumptions, the MAC may increase rather than decrease, when technology is allowed to adjust. This result, which goes against the assumptions commonly made in the literature, is not novel in the sense that others have made the case for an increasing MAC (e.g. Amir et al., 2008; Baker et al., 2008; Bauman et al., 2008; Heal and Tarui, 2010; Perino and Requate, 2012) . 23 Our modelling of brown technology di ers from these other contributions, however, in that in our framework new technology is always green per se, since PH < 0. Technological change turns brown due to possible complementarity between technology and physical capital, which leads to the environmental impacts -see the discussion leading up to Assumption 2.
The second term in the expression of the ITC e ect in (24), dH /dP, gauges the impact of changes in pollution on investment in technology. At the initial equilibrium, each rm sets the level of investment in K and H according to the rst-order conditions (15) and (16). Totally di erentiating these two equations, recalling (8), and using the resulting expressions to solve for dH /dP, we nd:
22 Obviously, when Assumption 2 is violated and technology and physical capital are substitutes rather than complements, the MAC can only decrease with additional technology creation, and technology is always green. When (only) Assumption 1 is violated, technology is always brown. When both Assumptions 1 and 2 are violated, again technology can be either brown or green. 23 All the papers cited show that MAC curves for old and new technologies may actually cross, implying that the same innovation may be either green or brown, depending on the range of abatement, which clearly depends on the policy stringency. This is particularly relevant when, as in Perino and Requate (2012) for example, the evaluation of the e ect of environmental policy is performed against a 'no-policy' counterfactual. In the present paper, however, we only deal with marginal changes in policy stringency, so we disregard this aspect and classify technologies as either (locally) green or brown.
where we let ζ
≥ 0, see Assumption 5. In this expression, r P is the change in the rate of return to investment in technology brought about by a reduction in pollution. The rst term in the square bracket in (26) illustrates that the decision to invest in technology is driven by the increased demand for H linked to the decrease in pollution and the associated improvement in environmental quality. Intuitively, more stringent environmental policy crowds in additional investment in technology, its substitute factor. This is not the whole story, however, as investment in technology is also a ected by changes in the stock of physical capital -the second part of the bracket in (26). Under Assumption 3, investment in physical capital is reduced along with any reduction in pollution. Since capital and technology are complements, technology accumulation is reduced via this channel. Provided that the complementarity between K and H is suciently strong, environmental policy ends up crowding out investment in technology, which runs counter to traditional tenets. The following lemma formalizes this discussion. 24
Lemma 2. A marginal tightening of environmental policy crowds out investment in technology whenever
Proof. Crowding out as a consequence of environmental policy requires dH /dP > 0, the statement of the Lemma follows immediately from using (26) and recalling Assumption 3.
In our discussion so far we have explained how, in the context of a marginal tightening of exogenous environmental policy, the overall e ect of ITC depends on the colour of technology, i.e. whether technology is green or brown, and on whether environmental policy crowds technology in or out. From (24), it is clear that whenever the ITC term is positive, technological change proves pollution-saving, in the sense that -consistently with the dominant view -it reduces the marginal cost of pollution abatement. Interestingly, however, the possibility that technical change be pollution-using, i.e. that it might lead to an increase in the marginal abatement cost -a situation ruled out by most of the literature -is perfectly possible in our framework. 25 Lemma 3. Induced Technical Change is pollution-using whenever
This can only happen when brown technology is crowded in, which requires,
24 Lemma 2 holds for Assumptions 1-3. The possibility of crowing out also obtains when technology and physical capital are substitutes (i.e. when Assumption 2 is reversed). The condition under which crowding out arises becomes:
. With H K < 0, crowding out requires K P < K N , i.e. the productive externality associated with environmental quality be strong enough to reverse the sign in Assumption 3.
25 When technology and physical capital are substitutes rather than complements (i.e. when Assumption 2 is reversed), the possibility emerges that pollution-using technical change might result from the crowding out of green technology. Just like the case discussed in footnote 24 above, however, this result only obtains when the productive externality associated with environmental quality is su ciently strong, i.e. when K P < K N (and Assumption 3 is reversed).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Lemma 1 and 2.
The lemma highlights the potentially surprising conclusion that environmental policy may lead rms to make investment decisions that imply an increase in pollution. In fact, this outcome is less surprising when one considers that as the price of pollution increases, it depresses the returns to pollution-using technologies and at the same time, it boosts them through the indirect e ect of the improved environmental quality. Since the productivity e ect of environmental quality is an externality -rms do not internalize the e ect of their decisions on environmental quality and productivity -it may still be individually rational for rms to respond to high pollution prices (or better to the combination of higher prices and higher productivity) by investing in ways that, in equilibrium, increases pollution.
The fact that the marginal cost of pollution abatement might increase under induced technical change has profound implications for the analysis of environmental policy. In fact, when induced technological change proves pollution-using, the traditional conclusion that ITC makes environmental policy less expensive/more e ective is turned on its head. Figure 1, illustrates this point. In both panels, the initial equilibrium, point A in the graphs, is characterized by a pollution price equal to τ 0 , and by a level of pollution given by P 0 . The slope of the MAC curve at the initial equilibrium is given by the expression in (24). Since we only focus on marginal changes, we can ignore second order e ects that might change the slope of the MAC curve and simplify the diagram by drawing straight lines.
Consider how environmental policy operates when technology is completely exogenous , i.e. let the ITC term be zero. In this case, either an exogenous increase in the pollution charge from τ 0 to τ 1 , say, or a reduction of the number of permits in the cap-and-trade system from P 0 to P 1 produce the same outcome, namely a new equilibrium which obtains at a point like X , along the MAC curve.
Under ITC, however, the outcome depends on the interaction between the nature of technology, the rm's incentives to invest, and the type of instrument chosen by the regulator. The standard case discussed in the literature features pollution-saving technical change. As discussed above, in this case a more stringent environmental policy induces the crowding in of green technology, and the MAC curve shifts down to MAC S , where the S superscript is for 'saving'. The exact new equilibrium level depends on the choice of the instrument. Under exogenous taxation -see Figure 1 (a) -as the tax rises to τ 1 pollution falls more than in the exogenous technology case, and the new equilibrium is reached at point G. Figure 1(b) , instead, presents the equilibrium emerging when the regulator resorts to tradable emission permits. At the new equilibrium, point G , the pollution level is the same but the permit price is lower under ITC, since τ G < τ 1 .
Contrast this outcome, however, to what happens when environmental policy crowds in investments in brown technology. This has the e ect of making pollution more productive and it raises the opportunity cost of curbing it. The net e ect is that the MAC curve shifts upwards. The equilibrium MAC schedules under ITC -the dashed lines in the graphs marked MAC U , for 'using' -are now higher than when technology doesn't adjust. When the regulator uses a pollution charge, as in Figure 1 Figure 1(b) , the permit price increases more than in the exogenous technology scenario (to point B ). Since in the symmetric equilibrium τ equals the marginal cost of pollution reduction, induced pollution-using technical change makes environmental policy more costly.
The discussion above can be summarized as follows: Proposition 1. Under exogenous policy, induced pollution-using technical change leads to... i. ...a larger increase in the private marginal cost of environmental policy after a marginal tightening of the cap on pollution;
ii. ...a smaller pollution reduction following a marginal increase in the pollution charge.
Proof. In the text above.
This result presents a very di erent picture of the role of ITC from what is commonly discussed in the literature and sets our paper quite apart from the existing body of technology as it presents a rather more pessimistic view of the role of technology in solving environmental challenges. 26 26 In a related contribution, Perino and Requate (2012) nd that an increase in the stringency of environmental policy may result in a reduced rate of technology adoption by rms for a su ciently high level of stringency. Since their focus is on technology adoption and the dynamic e ciency of environmental policy, they compare their outcomes to a benchmark economy without policy -see Footnote 23. It follows that the introduction of environmental policy can increase aggregate emissions in their framework. In the present paper, however, our emphasis is on the role of ITC on the cost of policy, and we only focus on marginal changes in the stringency of existing policy. As a consequence, a scenario such as theirs cannot emerge here, and environmental policy always reduce pollution emissions. 
Welfare implications
Proposition 1 presents the implications of ITC for the e ectiveness and the cost of exogenous environmental policy. The natural next step is to investigate the consequences of ITC for the welfare gains due to a tightening of environmental policy. It is easiest in this context to start with a reduction in the emission cap, as in this case the introduction of ITC does not a ect the environmental integrity of the policy change, and comparisons across regimes are more straightforward.
Consider the utility function in (9), substitute for the level of consumption using the market clearing condition (10) and express the resulting expression as a function of P and H only using the symmetric equilibrium conditions in (8), and (21). Totally di erentiating the resulting expression and recalling the rst-order conditions (16)- (17), as well as the de nitions of the rst-best policy levels (18) and (20), we are able to get the following expression for the change in welfare in terms of consumption equivalents:
where
and k H is de ned in (25).
The expression above illustrates the channels through which a reduction in pollution a ects welfare. Moving from left to right across terms at the right-hand side, we see, rst of all, that a drop in pollution directly reduces the welfare costs from the environmental externality: given that the initial price of pollution is suboptimally low, a marginal reduction in pollution is bound to improve welfare. Next, since physical capital decreases as pollution declines (recall that k P > 0), welfare must improve: the over-supply of physical capital due to the excessive subsidies -see Assumption 6 -is moderated by the drop in pollution. Finally, the ITC e ect is captured by the second term in the curly bracket. A drop in pollution a ects welfare both via its direct e ect on H , captured by r P , and its indirect e ect on K, gauged by k H r P . Changes in pollution a ect welfare positively in as far as it increases investment in technology. If the drop in pollution leads to a reduction in physical capital via the induced changes in H , however, welfare gains are reduced.
Things are more complicated when we turn to considering environmental policy conducted via a tax instrument. In this case the channels mentioned above interact with the impact of ITC on the e ectiveness of the tax discussed in Proposition 1. Indeed, in this context any given increase in the tax has a di erent impact on the equilibrium level of pollution under ITC than when technology is exogenously given. To see this, simply multiply and divide the right-hand side of equation (27) by dτ , and use (24) to substitute for dP/dτ to get:
The additional term marked ITC emphasizes precisely the fact that under a pollution charge ITC in uences welfare also via its impact on the e ectiveness of the environmental tax. The 
ii. ...implies smaller welfare gains from a marginal increase in the pollution tax, whenever
Proof. See Appendix A.
Generally speaking, the statements in the proposition are quite intuitive: under Assumption 6 the crowding in of investment in technology is a positive consequence of environmental policy, and one would indeed expect that ITC compounds welfare gains when r P < 0. These positive e ects may, however, be reversed in the presence of a very strong inducement of investment in physical capital. Conversely, in the presence of crowding out, ITC would be expected to reduce welfare by worsening the under-provision of technology in the economy. In this case, the reduction in physical capital investment due to the complementarity between technology and physical capital might more than compensate for this negative impacts, again giving rise to mixed results.
Going beyond this general intuition and in order to grasp the second part of the proposition, it is necessary to take into account that when policy is implemented via a price instrument, ITC has the potential to limit the e ectiveness of environmental policy when technical change is pollution-using (see Proposition 1). To see what this implies in terms of welfare changes, consider the rst claim in part ii. of Proposition 2 above. In this crowding out scenarion, ITC is pollution-using when technology is brown, i.e. when m H > 0 (see Lemma 1). Thus, pollution-using technical chance compounds the negative e ects of crowding in physical capital discussed above. The condition presented in the proposition, re ects this as when m H > 0 the threshold for k H beyond which ITC represents a drag on welfare becomes easier to attain. On the contrary, when technological change is pollution-savingwhich, in the case of crowding in requires green technology (i.e., m H < 0) -ITC boosts the environmental bene ts from any increase in the pollution charge, and ITC tends to increase welfare, adding to the positive e ect of a drop in physical capital. This is evident in the rst S G E P ITC expression in part ii. above, which shows that, in this case, the requirements for ITC to contribute negatively to welfare become more stringent (recall that m P < 0). 27 We conclude this discussion by remarking that our results indicate that ITC may reduce the welfare bene ts from environmental policy under either types of technology -green or brown -and under either choice of policy instrument -quantity-based or price-based. Once again this suggests that the optimistic conclusions found elsewhere in the literature are a function of modelling and parametrization choices, rather than of more fundamental reasons.
Endogenous policy under induced innovation
Having discussed the behaviour of rms in the presence of environmental policy, we now turn to modelling the choice made by the environmental policy authority (the Environmental Protection Agency -EPA for short) of the 'best possible' policy. Realistically, we assume that the EPA attempts to maximize social welfare but is unable to choose investment policy, i.e. the investment subsidies are xed. As a consequence, the investment externalities are not correctly internalized and a second-best situation arises where environmental policy is used to address both the environmental and investment externalities.
The regulator's problem
The EPA's objective is to maximize the utility of the representative agent, given in (9), subject to the technological, environmental, and nancial constraints it faces -see equations (1), (2), and (10) respectively. In addition, the EPA needs to take into account that, once environmental policy is set, rms will choose their level of investment in both physical capital and technology according to their rst-order conditions (15) and (16). In short, the EPA's maximization program reads:
The rst-order necessary condition for this problem is, plainly:
Using our by now familiar approach, we express this equation as a function of P and H only. To do this, we rst note that we can use the goods market equilibrium condition (10), 27 A similar discussion holds for the case of crowding out, i.e. when r P < 0, keeping in mind, however, that in this case pollution-using technical change requires green technology.
together with the production and investment functions, (1), (3), and (5), and the symmetric equilibrium condition, (8), to rewrite consumption, C, as
Recalling the expression for ω (C, N ; ϕ) in (11), and using (8) along with (21), the rst-order condition above becomes
According to this expression, the (second-best) optimal level of pollution allowed by the EPA is such that the marginal cost of pollution abatement, m, equals the marginal bene t from pollution reduction, i.e. the marginal damage from pollution, at the right-hand side of the expression above. In the present context the social marginal damage of pollution di ers from the rst-best Pigouvian tax, τ * , as it additionally entails a correction that captures the distortionary e ect of the remaining externalities. Correspondingly the second-best pollution price needed to decentralize the social optimum is, using (26) to substitute the ratios in the rst-order condition,
Given the existence of the imperfectly corrected externalities linked to capital accumulation the EPA sets the price of pollution taking into account the e ect that environmental policy has on the rms' investment decisions. When environmental policy crowds in investment in technology, for example, the EPA optimally tends to set the price of pollution above the Pigouvian level. In this case the amelioration of the distortion connected to the sub-optimally low investment in H compounds the environmental bene ts, and a higher level of τ is warranted. The EPA, however, also needs to take into account that, in this context, a higher price for pollution, while alleviating the over-accumulation of physical capital directly, crowds in K via its complementarity with technology. If a more stringent environmental policy on balance increases physical capital investment, the regulator is naturally led to re-focus environmental policy towards the correction of the physical capital externality and opts for a laxer environmental policy. Clearly, the relative strength of the crowding in/out of physical capital and technology determines the sign and magnitude of the second-best wedge, (τ SB − τ * ). 28
In Section 4, we have shown that the presence of ITC a ects rms' marginal costs of abatement -i.e. the supply of pollution abatement -beyond the traditional view that it necessarily decreases marginal costs. This is obviously relevant in the present context as it a ects the optimal choice of pollution by the EPA by changing the left-hand side of the rst-order condition above. The discussion in the previous paragraph suggests that ITC 28 Formally, it is easy to show from (30) that in the presence crowding in of H , i.e. when r P < 0 the EPA naturally tends to impose a relatively more stringent environmental policy, unless the indirect crowding in of physical capital via the complementarity with technology proves too strong. In this case τ S B − τ * > 0
. Conversely, when it is the crowding out of technology to prevail and r P > 0,
may also modify the demand for pollution abatement, captured by the right-hand side of the rst-order condition. It follows that in the context of endogenous policy the role of ITC is much more pervasive than in the exogenous policy framework. This observation further underlines the relevance of our analysis in qualifying widespread misconceptions with respect to the role of ITC in environmental policy. We now turn our attention to the role of ITC in endogenous policy making.
A marginal greening of preferences
To investigate the role of ITC in the conduct of environmental policy in this second-best scenario, we let preference become 'greener' in the sense that environmental services become more valuable to consumers, and we analyze the endogenous change in environmental policy. This thought experiment parallels the exogenous marginal tightening of environmental policy that we have investigated in previous sections. Our goal is to compare changes in environmental quality in response to such a shock, with and without ITC. If, following a 'greening' of preferences, the level of pollution decreases less under ITC than in its absence, we can conclude that ITC makes environmental policy more costly to implement.
We start by rewriting the rst-order condition that characterizes the second best using (26) and re-arranging terms as:
Formally, our experiment is to shock this expression via an increase in the relative preference for environmental quality, parameterized by ϕ. Totally di erentiating (31) and rearranging terms gives us the following expression for how a greening of preferences changes the optimal level of pollution: 29
As indicated, the terms multiplied by ζ jointly capture the role of ITC in determining the optimal level of environmental quality. A positive (respectively, negative) ITC term leads to a lower (higher) level of pollution relative to the exogenous technology case for any given change in preference, as stated in our concluding result:
Proposition 3. Following a marginal greening of preferences, induced technical change leads to a smaller reduction in the second-best optimum level of pollution if and only if
This happens under crowding-in, when:
In deriving the expression in the text, we abstract from higher-order e ects by suppressing all third order partial derivatives.
and under crowding-out, when:
Proof. In Appendix A.
While the mechanics behind this result are clear, our goal in the remaining of this section is to focus on the economic intuition. We rst note here that m H r P in the ITC term in (32) captures the impact of ITC on the marginal costs of abatement and determines the pollution-saving, or -using nature of technical change (see Lemma 3). The remainder of the term gauges the e ect of ITC on the social marginal damage of pollution discussed in Section 5.1. More speci cally, the term τ * H r P captures the e ect on the Pigouvian tax, whereas the third and nal term measures the impact of ITC on the second-best wedge. Given this, it turns out that casting our discussion of the intuition behind Proposition 3 within the framework of the textbook marginal abatement cost/marginal damages graphs clari es the issues and provides useful insights.
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of condition (31). 30 The MAC curves represent the marginal cost of abatement and captures the rm's willingness to pay for pollution, m in (31). Each MAC curve is drawn for a di erent level of technology. The MD curves show the marginal damage of pollution, the right-hand side of equation (31) for a given level of ϕ and H . The second-best level of pollution obtains when, at the margin, the bene ts from a further reduction in pollution are just o set by the increase in the costs of pollution abatement. This level is graphically identi ed by the intersection of the appropriate MAC and MD curves. The initial equilibrium is at point A, where the level of technology equals H 0 , preferences have not yet shifted so that ϕ = ϕ 0 , and the level of pollution is P A .
Consider what the exogenous shift in preferences does to the equilibrium, ignoring for the moment the role of technological change. As ϕ increases to ϕ 1 indicating a relative greening of societal preferences, the MD curve shifts upwards since consumers are now more willing to pay for environmental quality. With given technology, the new equilibrium obtains at point B. As expected, the level of pollution is lower and environmental quality higher.
Let us now focus on how ITC modi es this picture. First of all, following the change in preferences, and the increased demand for environmental quality, rms adjust their level of investment in both technology and physical capital. This leads to a change in the (opportunity) cost of abatement. This aspect was analyzed at length in Section 4, and in particular in Lemma 3. Figure 2 captures the case where the MAC curve shifts down due to pollutionsaving technical change, for example as a consequence of the crowding in of green technology. 31 Not surprisingly, if we were to neglect any other impact of ITC, we would conclude 30 The gure distinguishes between the model with induced technical change (the heavier solid lines) and the model in which the level of investment doesn't adjust following a change in preferences (the lighter lines). In principle, the two models would generate di erent initial equilibrium levels of pollution. To facilitate the comparability between the two models and to isolate the e ect of ITC, however, we assume an appropriate calibration of the two models such that they share the same initial equilibrium. 31 As discussed in Section 4, a downward shift of the MAC curve might just as well be the result of the crowding out of brown technology.
The second-best level of environmental quality when green technology is crowded in.
that in the presence of ITC a larger reduction in pollution obtains as the new equilibrium would be at point C. This conclusion, which is in line with the conventional view that induced technical change lowers the cost of environmental policy, is however incomplete and, as we will see shortly, potentially misleading. As a matter of fact ITC exerts a complex in uence also on the social marginal damages from pollution and therefore a ects the position of the MD curve.
The social value of pollution damages changes both because of the changes in the optimal level of the Pigouvian tax, and because of the changes in the second-best distortion. As refers to the rst aspect we can show the following result:
Lemma 4. Following a marginal reduction in pollution, induced technical change increases the optimal Pigouvian tax, whenever
This happens under crowding in when
and under crowding out when
The expression in the curly brackets provides insights as to why the Pigouvian tax changes with H . On the one hand, changes in investment a ect consumption and modify the consumers' willingness to pay for environmental quality. On the other hand, since ( N H + N K k H ) > 0, more H and K make the economy larger, and a larger economy is one worth protecting more against pollution -there is simply more to lose due to environmental degradation.
The Lemma tells us that when technology and physical capital are complements, any change in the economic environment that crowds in investment in technology raises the marginal damages from pollution and hence boosts the demand for environmental quality provided that the externality arising from the over-investment in physical capital is not too strong. At the same time, when investment is crowded out, the demand for environmental quality tends to fall in response to environmental policy unless a su ciently forceful countervailing reduction in the externality associated with the accumulation of physical capital reverses this outcome.
The second aspect, i.e. the impact of ITC on the second-best correction in (30), is the subject of our next result:
Lemma 5. Following a marginal reduction in pollution, induced technical change increases the stringency of second best taxation whenever, either
Thus, when environmental policy crowds out technology, investment in both types of capital are necessarily reduced. It follows that the optimal subsidy level decreases for both types of investment. For given levels of σ and θ , therefore, the distortion associated with physical capital becomes more salient than the one associated with H and the EPA concentrates on correcting it. This leads to an increase in policy stringency or, equivalently for a given τ * , to an increase in the second-best tax gap.
Conversely, when environmental policy crowds in technology, it makes the knowledge externality more relevant by increasing σ * . This justi es an increase in τ SB , all else equal. Investment in physical capital, however, is itself a ected by the tightening in environmental policy. On the one hand, a fall in pollution reduces the accumulation of its complementary factor, K, which reduces the necessity to use environmental policy to correct the learningby-doing distortion. On the other hand, technology and physical capital are themselves complements and crowding in technology leads to an increased demand for physical capital. If the inducement of physical capital via ITC proves strong enough, it o sets the former channel and makes more stringent environmental policy attractive. The condition in the proposition captures precisely this trade-o : only if the joint e ect of more H and more K is strong enough will the second-best tax increase.
These lemmas clearly show that in the multiple distortions world we model in this paper ITC might well lead to either an increase or a drop in the demand for environmental quality.
The second-best level of environmental quality when brown technology is crowded in.
An increase in demand would compound the e ects of pollution-saving technical change, strengthening the optimistic conclusions held by proponents of the conventional view. Under such circumstances, a further upwards shift of the MD schedule in the gure would lead to an even larger drop in pollution. Perhaps surprisingly, however, even in this pollutionsaving technical change context, things may also go di erently. Indeed, if the crowding in of physical capital associated with the increased investment in technology is su ciently strong, and/or the initial distortion due to the physical capital subsidies large enough, then the opportunity cost of large pollution reductions increases, reducing the demand for environmental quality: this mechanism is captured by a downward shift of the MD curve. If this reduction in the demand for environmental quality is su ciently pronounced, the nal second-best equilibrium may well feature a higher level of pollution under ITC, than would have been the case in the absence of adjustments in investment levels. The necessary condition for such an outcome is given in the text of Proposition 3 and, quite intuitively, requires a large negative impact from the crowding in of physical capital.
An outcome such as the one we just described, in which ITC proves to be a drag for pollution reduction is perhaps less surprising in the context of pollution-using technical change. As shown in Figure 3 , while the downward shift of the MD curve is the same as in the previous case, the pollution-using nature of technical change leads to an increase in the marginal cost of pollution abatement. As a consequence of both shifts, the decrease in pollution implied by the greening of preferences is severely curtailed. Notice, moreover, that in the case just discussed ITC might impact negatively on the amount of pollution abated even if the demand for environmental quality were to increase. Indeed, a su ciently large shift upwards of the MAC curve could still lead to an equilibrium characterized by a level of pollution in excess of P B .
To conclude, we need to address the last case covered by Proposition 3, namely the case in and that "the availability of new technologies is crucial for the ability to realistically implement stringent carbon policies" (IPCC, 2014, Chapter 15, page 1178).
As we argued in the introduction, however, this view is at odds with the historical record showing that technological change may well turn out to be pollution-using. The existing consensus on the role of ITC simply abstracts from this possibility, and thus concludes that ITC necessarily reduces the cost of environmental policy. Our discussion in this paper strives to reconcile the historical record with the theory, and provides several new insights into the relationship between ITC and (the cost of) environmental policy that have important consequences for the design of environmental policy.
Our rst result shows that ITC can increase the cost of environmental policy when technological change is pollution-using, which implies that the marginal cost of pollution abatement increases following the introduction of new technology (Proposition 1). While the literature on environmental policy and induced technical change has almost universally drawn attention to pollution-saving technical change, pollution-using technical change is far from a special case. Both Baker et al. (2008) der, 1999; Goulder and Mathai, 2000; Sue Wing, 2006; Gerlagh, 2007) , quite simply because such analyses abstract from the possibility of pollution-using technical change: by assuming that technology is always green and that environmental policy necessarily crowds in new technology, they implicitly end up assuming that ITC is pollution-saving. The key point we make in this paper is that it is the combination of the characteristics of speci c innovations, the strength of the production externalities, and the degree of technology-capital complementarity that endogenously determine whether or not in general equilibrium investment in a given technology proves green and is stimulated by environmental policy.
Proposition 2 discusses the welfare costs of ITC under exogenous policy, analyzing both the case where a quantity instrument is used, and the case when a price instrument is instead favoured. In this part of the paper we emphasize the complex interactions existing between environmental externalities and investment spillovers. We show, for example, that the welfare bene ts from a drop in pollution may be partly o set by the crowding out underprovided technology. Our analysis transparently reveals the crucial role played by incompletely internalized external e ects, and sheds additional light on di erences across estimates of the value of ITC in CGE models. For example, Buonanno et al. (2003) neglect the role of market failures in R&D, and obtain larger estimates for the impact of ITC on the cost of environmental policy than Popp (2004) , who explicitly recognizes the divergence between the social and the private returns to innovation.
Our third result focuses on the importance of general equilibrium e ects in this debate. Proposition 3 emphasizes that ITC also a ects the consumers' marginal willingness to pay for environmental quality improvements. As the willingness to pay changes, so does the relative costliness of environmental policy and the equilibrium level of environmental quality. We show that shifts in both the MAC curve and the marginal damage curve are crucial to the nal outcome, and that a negative role for ITC may emerge even when technological change is pollution-saving from the point of view of the representative rm. One key di erence exists between our analysis and the existing literature. In our general equilibrium model, changes in investment a ect income and consumption and hence, through shifting the demand for environmental quality, a ect marginal damages. Most of the existing literature, however, frames this question in a partial equilibrium context, typically assuming that the marginal bene ts from pollution reduction equal (the present value of avoided) marginal pollution damages, that only depend on environmental magnitudes (pollution stock, environmental quality, etc.). In the context of our model, this would imply that marginal damages depend on N , but not H . By construction, then, ITC does not a ect environmental policy via changes in marginal damages, and the general equilibrium e ects we nd here are neglected. Both Goulder and Mathai (2000) and Heal and Tarui (2010) , for example, posit a social loss function that is additively separable in abatement costs and dam-S G E P ITC 27 ages, where the latter only depend on cumulative emissions. The sharp contrast between the unambiguously positive e ect of ITC in partial equilibrium models, and our much more nuanced conclusions highlights the importance of considering general equilibrium e ects when gauging the relevance of ITC for environmental policy.
Overall our analysis paints a profoundly di erent picture of the link between ITC and the cost of environmental policy from the one commonly found in the literature. Indeed a far less attering role may emerge for ITC when technology is complementary with physical capital that needs polluting inputs or when additional uncorrected distortions are present in the economy. Arguably, these situations are far from uncommon, and represent a more realistic description of actual economies than stylized rst-best models.
The policy implications of our analysis are signi cant, especially since our results are obtained in an empirically plausible framework. In a second-best context with multiple externalities, induced innovation, far from being the deus ex-machina that enables the achievement of ambitious environmental targets, was shown to have the potential to increase the cost of environmental regulation. Our discussion in this paper suggests that, as long as traditional polluting sectors are subsidized and the economy remains locked into pollutionintensive technologies, the incremental (green) innovation induced by environmental policies is likely to become counterproductive and to only increase demand for pollution in these sectors. . From (27), this implies (σ * − σ ) + (θ * − θ ) k H ζ r P > 0.
The statement in the proposition follows immediately taking into account that ζ > 0.
Ad ii. From equation (28), we have in this case that: dU dτ r P =0 > dU dτ r P 0 ⇔ ⇔ (τ * − τ ) − (θ * − θ ) k P m P < (τ * − τ ) − (θ * − θ ) k P − (σ * − σ ) + (θ * − θ ) k H ζr P m P + m H ζr P .
Recalling that m P + m HrP < 0, we can rewrite the last expression as:
Simple manipulations, and the fact that m P < 0, lead to the inequalities in the statement of the Proposition.
